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DISCOVERY-PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
United States v. Agurs, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (1976)
The United States Supreme Court recently handed
down a decision in United States v. Agurs' that dealt
with a prosecutor's failure to volunteer exculpatory
evidence prior to trial. 2 The Court held that a
prosecutor's failure to deliver to the defense certain
unrequested background information concerning a
murder victim, which may have tended to support
the accused's self-defense claim, did not deprive the
accused of a fair trial as guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. ' The Court
explained that constitutional error occurs and a new
trial would be required only if a nondisclosure results
in a fundamentally unfair conviction. A conviction is
unfair if the undisclosed evidence is found to be
sufficiently "material" by a reviewing court. ' The
Court stated that the standard to determine material-
ity is whether the omitted evidence creates a reasona-
ble doubt regarding the defendant's guilt that did not
previously exist. The Court applied this standard to
the facts of Agurs and did not find the nondisclosure
to be material.
Agurs involved a case where the jury found the
respondent, Linda Agurs, guilty of second degree
murder. Agurs, a prostitute, and James Sewell
registered in a motel. Circumstantial evidence indi-
cated that Sewell left the room and returned to find
Agurs in the process of going through his clothing
and robbing him. A fight began, and after hearing
Agurs screaming for help, three motel employees
forcibly entered the room to find Sewell on top of her
struggling for possession of a bowie knife. ' Sewell
died, and an autopsy revealed that he had several
deep stab wounds and numerous slashes all over his
body. When respondent surrendered to police, she
196 S.Ct. 2392 (1976).
"Id. at 2395.
"'No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V.
The Court in Agurs stated that its construction of the due
process clause "will apply equally to the comparable clause
in the Fourteenth Amendement applicable to trials in state
courts." 96 S.Ct. at 2399.
'Implicit in a finding of materiality is that the evidence
is favorable to the defendant and relevant to the issues of
guilt or punishment.
'When Sewell and Agurs registered at the motel, Sewell
had the bowie knife and another knife in his possession, as
well as $360. 96 S.Ct. at 2395
was given a physical examination, revealing no cuts
or bruises of any kind.
At trial, respondent offered a self-defense plea,
based on the argument that Sewell had initially
attacked her with a knife, and that her actions
constituted an attempt to save her life. ' Three
months after respondent was convicted, defense
counsel filed a motion for a new trial. The motion
asserted, inter alia, that the prosecutor failed to
disclose information concerning Sewell's prior crimi-
nal record that would have been further evidence of
his violent character. ' The district court denied the
motion, 8 holding that the evidence of Sewell's prior
criminal record was insufficiently material for its
nondisclosure to require a new trial. ' The court
explained that a specific defense request for evidence
is not essential to a materiality finding. Neverthe-
less, the court reasoned that the evidence in Agurs
was not material, because Sewell's criminal record
was merely repetitive of the other available evidence
concerning his character. The court emphasized that
regardless of this character evidence, respondent's
self-defense claim was inconsistent with the medical
evidence concerning the injuries received by both
parties. The court of appeals reversed, "0holding that
the "evidence. . .is sufficiently material and impor-
tant to the question of appellant's guilt or innocence
. 11 as to require a new trial, since the jury's
'The Court explained that:
[S]upport for this self-defense theory was based on
the facts that she had screamed for help, Sewell was on
top of her when help arrived, and his possession of two
knives indicated that he was a violence-prone person.
Id. at 2396.
"The defense argued that this evidence was admissible
and relevant to the issue of who was the aggressor,
regardless of defendant's knowledge of it, citing United
States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Burks held
that evidence of a victim's violent character is admissible
where a claim of self-defense is raised.
'96 S.Ct. at 2396.
'The district court used the standard of materiality
ultimately adopted by the Court.
10510 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The circuit court
found materiality without defining the term, but by stating
that if Sewell's prior criminal record had been revealed to
the jury, they would clearly have found that he was a
violence-prone person. The court cited Burks to demon-
strate that this evidence would have been admissible.
" 510 F.2d at 1254.
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verdict might have been affected by the introduction
of the evidence. 12
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
in a majority opinion delivered by Justice Stevens,
stating that the circuit court had incorrectly inter-
preted the constitutional requirement of due proc-
ess. "The majority opinion began with a discussion
of three nondisclosure situations having the common
element that information was discovered after trial
which had been known to the prosecution but un-
known to the defense. The Court explained that the
general rule of Brady v. Maryland' can "arguably"
be applied to each of these situations. Brady is the
landmark decision concerning the suppression of evi-
dence, where the Court held that:
[Tihe suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecutor. 15
By demonstrating how the general rule is applied
differently in each situation, the Court illustrated the
necessity of the materiality standard which it ulti-
mately applied to the facts in Agurs.
In the first situation, the undisclosed evidence
demonstrates that the prosecution's case included
perjured testimony, and that knowledge of the
perjury can be imputed to the prosecutor. The Court
cited a group of cases "that support the general rule
that a conviction obtained through the use of know-
"The court refused to rehear the case en banc. 96 S.Ct.
at 2397 n. 6.
"Id. at 2397.
14373 U.S. 83 (1964).
"Id. at 87.
"This area of perjury can be further divided into two
categories. The first includes cases in which the prosecutor
solicited perjured testimony: in Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935), a radical labor leader claimed that his
murder conviction was obtained through the use of manu-
factured physical evidence and testimony that the prosecu-
tor knew to be fraudulent. The Supreme Court found in
dicta that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct was incon-
sistent with the concept of a fair trial and constituted a
denial of due process. In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213
(1942), the Court expressly proscribed the knowing use of
perjured testimony.
The second category includes cases in which the prosecu-
tor was aware that certain testimony was perjured, and
although the testimony was not solicited by him, he allowed
it to stand uncorrected: in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959), an important witness falsely testified that he
received no promise of consideration in return for his
testimony, when in fact the Assistant State's Attorney had
promised the witness consideration. In Alcorta v. Texas,
355 U.S. 28 (1957), a witness falsely denied having had
ingly false evidence is fundamentally unfair and
therefore constitutes a due process violation. In this
situation, a nondisclosure is material if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony
could have affected the decision of the jury. 1? This
strict standard of materiality has been applied to
perjury cases because they involve prosecutorial
misconduct as well as a "corruption of the truth-
seeking function of the trial process." "The Court
found that this standard did not apply to Agurs,
because "this case involves no misconduct, and there
is no reason to question the veracity of any of the
prosecution witnesses .... ))19
The second situation is illustrated by the facts of
Brady, 20 where the defense made a pretrial request
for specific evidence, and the prosecutor failed to
deliver it. The Court pointed out that implicit in the
materiality requirement of the Brady holding is a
concern that "the suppressed evidence might have
affected the outcome of the trial." 2 A defense request
is desirable because it gives the prosecutor notice of
exactly what evidence the defense is interested in, and
the Court emphasized the prosecutor's duty when
such a request is made:
Although there is ... no duty to provide defense
counsel with unlimited discovery of everything known
by the prosecution, if the subject matter of such a
request is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for
claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require
the prosecution to respond either by furnishing the
information or by submitting the problem to a trial
judge. When the prosecutor receives a specific and
relevant request, the failure to make any response is
seldom, if ever, excusable. 22
intercourse with the accused's wife, and the prosecutor was
aware of the truth. In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972), the government failed to disclose to the defense a
promise made to a key witness that he would not be
prosecuted if he cooperated with the government.
"Napuev. Illinois, 360 U.S. at 271-72.
1896 S.Ct. at 2397.
19
1d.
20373 U.S. at 84-85. Brady was involved with Boblit in a
robbery-murder, and was convicted and sentenced to death.
The defense requested the statements that Boblit had made
to the police, and the prosecutor disclosed to the defense
all but one of the statements. In the withheld statement
Boblit admitted that he had strangled the victim. The
Maryland Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, but only
on the issue of punishment. The court did not order a
new trial on the issue of guilt because under the Mary-
land felony murder rule, Brady was guilty of murder,
regardless of who did the actual killing. The Supreme
Court upheld the Maryland court's restriction of the new
trial to the issue of punishment.
2196 S.Ct. at 2398.
22Id. at 2399.
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The Court did not apply the materiality standard
of Brady to Agurs, because Agurs did not involve an
unanswered request for specific evidence.
The Court introduced the third situation to which
Brady "arguably" applies, by admitting that it had
not yet decided whether the prosecutor has a duty to
disclose exculpatory information to the defense when
no request has been made. 2 But even assuming the
prosecutor does have a duty of disclosure, the test of
materiality "is not necessarily the same as in a
[specific] request situation." 24 The Court noted that
under some circumstances the defense may not be
aware that certain exculpatory evidence exists, and
therefore will either not make a request or will make
a general request for "anything exculpatory." The
Court pointed out that neither a general request nor
failure to request gives the prosecutor notice of what
evidence the defense is interested in. Nevertheless,
the Court explained that if the prosecutor has a duty
to respond to a general request, "it must derive from
the obviously exculpatory character of certain evi-
dence in the hands of the prosecutor." 25 If evidence
is so "obviously exculpatory" that the prosecutor is
given notice of a duty to produce, "that duty should
equally arise even if no request is made." 2 By
focusing on the prosecutor's duty to disclose as a
function of the exculpatory nature of the evidence,
the Court concluded that there is no significant
difference between cases where there has been a
general request for exculpatory evidence and cases
where no request has been made, and that the
prosecutor's duty of disclosure in both situations is
identical.
The Court further analyzed the third situation,
and considered whether the prosecutor has a consti-
tutional duty to voluntarily disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense, and if so, what standard of
materiality gives rise to that duty. The Court
explained that the same standard of materiality
applies prior to trial when the prosecutor must
2 This third situation is the only one where the
applicability of Brady is uncertain. Until this point, the
Court had not yet decided if the prosecutor has a duty to
disclose unrequested information to the defense.
A few of the circuits have in fact imposed a duty of
disclosure on the prosecutor in the absence of a request:
United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967);
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); United
States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.
1964).




decide what evidence to voluntarily submit to the
defense, as well as after trial when a reviewing court
must decide whether a nondisclosure deprived the
defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. 27
The Court emphasized the fact that the prosecutor's
constitutional duty of disclosure would be violated
only if the nondisclosure was material and thereby
resulted in an unfair trial for the defendant. There-
fore, although the Court discussed the possibility of
procedural rules being developed to allow complete
discovery, it concluded that the prosecutor does not
have a constitutional obligation to disclose his entire
files to the defense. 28
In attempting to define the proper constitutional
requirement of materiality in Agurs, Justice Stevens
pointed out that the prosecutor's constitutional obli-
gation is not measured by his moral culpability or
willfulness, 29since Brady expressly found the issue of
prosecutorial good or bad faith to be irrelevant to the
determination of materiality. " The character of the
evidence rather than the character of the prosecutor
determines whether the suppression of evidence
results in constitutional error.
The defendant's burden of proof varies with the
27
1d.
2 But see the circuit court's decision in Agurs, 510 F.2d
at 1254, where the court decided that the prosecutor had a
constitutional obligation to disclose any information which
might affect the jury's verdict.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court said that the jury's
verdict might be affected by any evidence, regardless of
whether it is trivial or material to the issue of guilt, and that
a nondisclosure constitutes constitutional error only if the
evidence is material.
If everything that might influence a jury must be
disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge
his constitutional duty would be to allow complete
discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.
96 S.Ct. at 2400.
See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), where a
similar conclusion was reached with regard to police
investigatory work. In Moore, tndisclosed evidence of a
witness misidentification of the accused was found not to be
material to the issue of guilt. In In re Imler, 60 Cal. 2d 554,
387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 908 (1964), the court held that representatives of the
state must only disclose evidence that is material.
2'96 S.Ct. at 2400. The Court discussed the prosecutor's
general duty to be faithful to the state's overriding interest
that "justice shall be done," citing the district court's
statement regarding situations in which "evidence is obvi-
ously of such substantial value to the defense that elemen-
tary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a
specific defense request." The prosecutor is therefore seen
as having the dual task of convicting the guilty and ensuring
that the innocent are protected from erroneous convictions.
"SSee note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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materiality standard adopted. In cases where new
evidence is discovered from a neutral source after
trial, and a Rule 33 motion is made by the defense, a
defendant usually has the severe burden of demon-
strating that the newly discovered evidence would
probably have resulted in an acquittal. 3 If new
evidence is discovered in the prosecutor's possession,
the Court felt that the defendant's burden should be
less, in order to preserve the "special significance of
the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of
justice." 2
Where error is present in the record, under the
harmless error standard"3 the defendant's burden is
quite small, since the reviewing judge must set aside
the verdict unless he is "sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but only slight effect." 4
Since almost all nondiselosed evidence might have
more than a "slight effect" on the jury, and the Court
had already rejected the prosecutor's duty of total
disclosure, the Court concluded that the defendant in
Agur.r must prove more than "slight effect" in order
to meet the constitutional standard of materiality. 31
The Court concluded that the proper standard of
materiality must reflect "our overriding concern with
the justice of the finding of guilt." "6Since a finding of
guilt is permissible only if evidence supports it
beyond a reasonable doubt, undisclosed evidence
constitutes constitutional error only if it creates a
reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's guilt that
did not previously exist. "' Support for this standard
of materiality was found by the Court in the decisions
of several of the circuits. 38
"
5FED. R. CRim. P. 33 provides for the granting of a new
trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. See
Ashe v. United States, 288 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1961), and
United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974), which demonstrate how Rule
33 is applied.
3296 S.Ct. at 2401. See also Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78 (1935).
"5FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) embodies the current harmless
error standard. A similar standard was applied in Kot-
teakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
"4 Id. at 764. The harmless error standard appears to be
very similar to the standard adopted by the circuit court in
Agurs.
3596 S.Ct. at 2401.
361d.
371d.
"See Stout v. Cupp, 426 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1970)
(evidence of a psychiatric examination report of the rape
victim was not disclosed to the defense; held, the evidence
was not material because the jury would not have reached a
different result had the evidence been placed before it);
Peterson v. United States, 411 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 920 (1969) (evidence concerning witnesses
After analyzing the language of the circuit
courts, 3 Justice Stevens ultimately decided that the
district court in the instant case applied the proper
standard to the facts in Agurs by measuring the
significance of Sewell's prior criminal record against
the context of the entire trial.
Stressing in particular the incongruity of a claim
that Sewell was the aggressor with the evidence of his
multiple wounds and respondent's unscathed condi-
tion, the trial judge indicated his unqualified opinion
that respondent was guilty.. . . Sewell's prior record
did not contradict any evidence offered by the prosecu-
tor, and was largely cumulative of evidence that Sewell
was wearing a bowie knife... and carrying a second
knife in his pocket . . . .
Since the undisclosed evidence would not have
created a reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the
defendant which did not otherwise exist, nondisclo-
sure did not deprive respondent of a fair trial.
The dissent agreed with the majority opinion
insofar as it held that "the prosector's constitutional
duty to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense is
not limited to cases in which the defense makes a
request for such evidence.""' The dissent took issue,
however, with the burden that the majority's stan-
dard imposes on a defendant. Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, interpreted the majority's
standard as allowing a defendant relief "only if the
withheld evidence actually creates a reasonable doubt
as to guilt in the judge's mind." 2 The dissent agreed
that where the prosecutor withholds evidence, a
lesser burden should be imposed on the defendant
to a bank burglary was not disclosed to the defense; held:
the evidence was not material, because it would not have
aided the defense); Lessard v. Dickson, 394 F.2d 88 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1004 (1968) (evidence that a
motel telephone operator had informed the police that the
murder victim had had a visitor was not disclosed to the
defense; held: the evidence was not material because it did
not have much force against the "inexorable array of
incriminating circumstances with which the defendant was
surrounded"); United States v. Tomaiolo, 378 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1967) (evidence regarding the identity of the perpetra-
tor of an armed robbery was not disclosed to the defense;
held: the evidence was not material because it was specula-
tive and "wholly lacking in probative force").
"The Court explained that its statement of the material-
ity standard "describes the test which courts appear to have
applied in actual eases although the standard has been
phrased in different language." 96 S.Ct. at 2402.
401d.
4"ld. Cf .Justice Marshall's dissent in Moore, where he
advocated the abolition of the request requirement. 408
U.S. at 807 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
4296 S.Ct. at 2403.
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than in a case where newly discovered evidence
comes from a neutral source. But Justice Marshall
felt that the standard enunciated by the Court
imposed as great or even a greater burden on the
defendant than that imposed in a Rule 33 case. 48 He
argued that the prosecutor's duty to ensure that
justice prevails is best fulfilled if all relevant evidence
as to guilt or innocence is revealed to the jury. The
dissent conceded that a new trial cannot be granted
whenever the prosecutor fails to disclose evidence "of
some value" to the defense, because there is a general
interest in finality of judgments, stating that "even a
conscientious prosecutor will fail to appreciate the
significance of some items of information."' 4 Never-
theless, the dissent failed to agree with the standard
of materiality adopted by the majority.
One cause of disagreement with the majority's
materiality standard was the dissent's belief that
when the question of materiality is a close one, it may
result in the prosecutor's concealing evidence from
the defense. " According to Justice Marshall, the
majority's rule "gives little incentive" to the prosecu-
tion to disclose evidence to the defense. "' It can be
inferred that the dissent believed that concealment
would occur, because the defendant's burden is so
heavy as to make a materiality finding unlikely. But
the dissent's chief concern with the majority standard
was that it "usurps the function of the jury as the
trier of fact in a criminal case," since the standard
"explicitly establishes the judge as the trier of fact
with respect to evidence withheld by the prosecu-
tion." 47
The dissent argued that the cases cited by the
majority in support of the position that the federal
courts have previously used its standard do not in
4 'Justice Marshall argued that the two standards would
be satisfied by the same evidence. That is, if the evidence
created a reasonable doubt as to guilt in the judge's mind
(the Court's standard), it probably would have resulted in
an acquittal (the Rule 33 standard). Id.
44Id.
"The majority opinion dealt with this practical question
quite differently, by stating that "the prudent prosecutor
will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Id. at
2399.
4"Id. at 2404.
4'Id. Justice Marshall was arguing that the standard
should be in terms of changing the mind of thejury, rather
than that of the judge. It is interesting to note that one
commentator has minimized the difference between the
two, by saying that "... such speculation about effect on
jury seems often to mean that the court believes that the de-
fendant is guilty, and therefore assumes that a jury would
agree." Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 112, 129 (1972).
reality support the standard. 48 The opinion quoted
the language used in these cases, to demonstrate that
it is different from the precise language used by the
Court. "' Accordingly, the dissent stated that the
prevailing standard of materiality in the federal
courts that arguably could apply to the facts in Agurs
is whether
there is a significant chance that the withheld evi-
dence, developed by skilled counsel, would have
induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough
jurors to avoid a conviction. .... so
This "jury effect" standard is very similar to the
standard that the majority used in cases involving
perjury. The dissent argued that the reasons for this
lesser burden on the defendant in perjury cases"'
apply to any case where favorable evidence is
withheld, regardless of whether the evidence is
"directly contradictory to evidence offered by the
prosecutor." 2 The dissent discussed an example
offered by Justice Fortas, in his concurring opinion in
Giles v. Maryland, " concerning the nondisclosure of
information that blood found on a victim did not
match the blood type of the victim or the accused.
The dissent argued that the suppression of this
evidence would corrupt the "truth-seeking process"
as much as would the prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured evidence. Although this reasoning seems to
be appropriate for the facts in Giles, it appears in-
" See note 38 supra.
"One could argue that the dissent's disagreement with
the cases used by the Court to support its standard is one of
form rather than substance. The contention that these cases
do not support the Court's standard because the language in
the cases is different from the precise language used by the
Court is refuted by the Court's interpretation of the
language in these cases as supportive of its standard.
"'96 S.Ct. at 2404. The cases cited by the dissent as
supporting this standard contain language different from
the precise language of the standard. Yet this very difference
in language was the basis of the dissent's criticism of the
cases used by the majority to support its standard. See
Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975) (the court held that a new
trial was not required, because the undisclosed evidence
would not have created a reasonable possibility of a
different result); Clarke v. Burke, 440 F.2d 853 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972) (the court held
that suppressed evidence must be "vital and material" in
order for conviction to be reversed); United States v. Miller,
411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) (the standard advocated by
Justice Marshall was stated, but arguably the case was
decided on the basis of a Rule 33 motion).
"See text accompanying note 16 supra.
5296 S.Ct. at 2405.
s3386 U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 67
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appropriate for the facts in Agurs. The "blood" ex-
ample involves blatant prosecutorial misconduct,
since the evidence was clearly exculpatory, yet these
factors are absent in Agurs. It therefore seems doulbt-
ful whether the perjury standard can be used in all
cases where there is a nondisclosure of evidence.
However, by determining that prosecutorial mis-
conduct was not a consideration in the perjury stan-
dard, the dissent found that this standard could ap-
propriately be used in Agurs. "
The logic of the Agurs decision, therefore, points
to three main conclusions: (1) undisclosed evidence
can be found to be material regardless of whether the
defense requested it; (2) a prosecutor does not have a
constitutional duty to disclose the entire contents of
his files to the defense; and (3) the defendant's bur-
den in proving materiality varies according to the
circumstances of the situation in which the nondis-
closure occurs.
The Court's first conclusion concerning the non-
essential nature of a request represents a break from
an earlier position held by the Court regarding the
significance of a request for information. The Court
in Brady specifically included the element of a
request in its holding that "the suppression of
evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process ...." "
When the Court discussed the holding in Brady as it
applied to the facts in Moore v. Illinois, "the request
element was reiterated. But a closer reading of
Moore demonstrates an erosion of the request
requirement. If the Court had been strictly interpret-
ing the request requirement in the Brady holding, it
could have decided Moore by simply stating that
since there was no request, there could not be
materiality. Nevertheless, the Court looked at the
actual merits of the undisclosed evidence, examining
its importance and relevance, before deciding that it
was not material to the issue of guilt. " Both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Agurs recognized
that strictly interpreting the request requirement
"Perhaps Justice Marshall was attempting to put a
lesser burden on the defendant to reflect his view of liberal
discovery as set out in his dissenting opinion in Moore v.
Illinois. He stated there that prosecutors should have the
responsibility of producing all known relevant evidence
tending to show innocence. 408 U.S. at 810 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
65373 U.S. at 87.
58408 U.S. 786 (1972).
5 One commentator has argued that judicial repetition
of the request requirement may only be intended to
"emphasize the desirability of a request whenever feasible."
Comment, supra note 53, at 117.
would often result in harm to the defendant, as
certain evidence unknown to the defense could have a
tremendous bearing on the issues of guilt or punish-
ment. It is interesting to note that the Court treated
Agurs as a case involving a "general request" for
evidence, " rather than a case involving no request,
and attempted to demonstrate why the two are
essentially the same. It therefore appears that the
Court was reluctant to explicity reject the request
element of the Brady rule, and it is still apparently
valid in a case where a request has been made. But in
the context of the Court's opinion in Agurs, it is clear
that the Court has rejected, albeit implicitly, the
request requirement as essential for a finding of
materiality.
The Court's second conclusion regarding the
limitation on the prosecutor's duty of disclosure
seems to follow naturally from its decision in Moore,
where it was found that all the police investigatory
work need not be disclosed to the defense. Although
the Court left open the possibility of complete dis-
closure being developed by means of procedural
rules, it held that such broad discovery is not con-
stitutionally required. Therefore, the prosecutor's
duty of disclosure is clearly limited only to evidence
that meets the materiality standard.
The Court's last conclusion is perhaps the least
clear and yet the most significant. The Court
attempted to define the concept of "materiality"
which had been introduced over a decade ago in
Brady. "In Agurs, the Supreme Court demonstrated
that the materiality standard varies according to the
situation in which the nondisclosure occurs. The
Court restated a materiality standard that had been
1196 S.Ct. at 2399.
"Brady was the first case in which the Supreme Court
found a denial of due process in a case that dealt with the
nondisclosure of favorable evidence and that did not involve
any type of perjured testimony. Although Brady set out the
general rule for the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence to
the defense that is "material to the accused's guilt or
punishment," the Court offered no explanation of what it
meant by "materiality."
The Court was given a perfect opportunity to define
the materiality standard in Giles, where the undisclosed evi-
dence concerned the character of the rape victim. The
introduction of new evidence allowed the Court to remand
to the state court, and to avoid dealing with the definition of
materiality. Nevertheless, Justice Fortas, in his concurring
opinion, defined a materiality standard that supported
disclosure of all evidence unless it was "merely repetitious,
cumulative, or embellishing of facts otherwise known to the
defense . . . or without importance to the defense." 386
U.S. at 98 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Moore also dealt with prosecutorial suppression of
evidence, but the Court merely held that the evidence was
19761
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developed previously in perjury cases " and at-
tempted to define materiality as it applies to two
other factual situations: (1) where there has been a
request and (2) where no request has been made.
The Court's attempts may have been intended to aid
prosecutors and courts in their determination of
the constitutional duty of disclosure in these spe-
cific instances. But does the Agurs standard really
lend specific practical guidance to prosecutors and
courts, or rather does it provide a means of rank-
ordering the defendant's burden of proving unfair-
ness in various situations?
The Court recognized in Agurs that the prosecutor
must disclose unrequested evidence to the defense
only if the evidence is material. The Court's defini-
tion of materiality, which was an attempt to define
an "inevitably imprecise standard," 6 is so ambigu-
ous and indefinite that its value to prosecutors and
courts is questionable. The majority implied that the
ultimate determination of whether evidence is mate-
rial will be made by a reviewing court after a
defendant has been convicted of a particular crime.
Therefore, any determination of the practical effect of
the standard in terms of actual disclosures can at
most be speculative.
Since the Court's standard offers no guidelines or
criteria, it can easily be seen how arbitrary these
decisions will become, how little certainty there will
be, and that the situation will be no different than
before the Agurs decision. It is difficult to conceive of
any definition short of explicit procedural rules or a
requirement of complete discovery that would pre-
cisely describe the prosecutor's constitutional duty of
disclosure. Considering the vagueness of the actual
words of the Court's standard and the inevitable
result that it will not be applied uniformly or
consistently, it is doubtful that the Court's "judicial
definition" of materiality is of any practical value.
Rather, the significance of Agurs is that a court or
";prosecutor can rank-order the defendant's burden of
proving unfairness according to the situation in
which a particular nondisclosure occurred. That is,
the majority opinion can be interpreted as a means of
comparing "how much" a defendant must prove in
order to establish materiality in accordance with the
"insufficiently material" to warrant a new trial. The Court
therefore, only by negative implication addressed itself to a
standard of materiality. Thus the Court in Moore again
avoided the issue of defining the materiality standard,
leaving courts and prosecutors without a means of deter-
mining the appropriate constitutional duty of disclosure.
"0 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
6196 S.Ct. at 2399.
circumstances under which the nondisclosure oc-
curred.
According to the harmless error standard, the
reviewing judge must set aside the verdict in cases
where there is an error in the trial record. The one
exception is when the error "did not influence the
jury or had but only a slight effect." 62 The Court did
not believe that every nondisclosure of evidence
should be regarded as reversible error, because there
is no constitutional duty to disclose all evidence. It
therefore stated that the constitutional standard of
materiality in Agurs must impose a greater burden
on the defendant than mere harmless error. "'
In cases where the prosecutor's evidence at trial
included perjured testimony, either directly solicited
or knowingly uncorrected by the prosecutor, the
standard for reversal is whether there is any reasona-
ble likelihood that the false testimony affected the
jury's decision. In cases of perjury, "the Court has
consistently held that a conviction . . . is fundamen-
tally unfair." 4 A reviewing court will almost always
grant a new trial when a conviction is obtained
through the use of false evidence.
The defendant's burden is arguably greater in
cases where a request for specific evidence by the
defense goes unanswered, but the burden is neverthe-
less slighter than in a case where there has not been a
request. The Court explained that implicit in the
materiality requirement in the Brady holding is a
concern that the suppressed evidence affected the
outcome of the trial. Nevertheless, the Court said,
"When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant
request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if
ever excusable." G'
In the two situations of perjury and unanswered
request, the prosecutor can be seen as being at fault.
Although the Court in Brady explicitly rejected the
prosecutor's good or bad faith in the determination
of materiality, it can be argued that the Court meant
that the absence of prosecutorial misconduct does not
preclude a finding of materiality, but that its exist-
ence can nevertheless be used as consideration in a
materiality finding. Since the Court's definition of
materiality varies according to the circumstances,
6 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. at 764.
6 It must be pointed out that the harmless error standard
is one of procedure, and the Court rejected its use in
constitutional cases of nondisclosure of evidence by the
prosecutor.
6496 S.Ct. at 2397 (emphasis supplied). See note 16 and
accompanying text supra.




prosecutorial misconduct can be viewed as one of the
circumstances that leads to a finding of materiality.
In the situation illustrated by the facts in Agurs,
the prosecutor may not have been aware of the
importance of the information to the defense, and the
Court explicitly stated that the prosecutor was not at
fault. In this situation, the defendant's burden is
apparently greater than in the previous two situa-
tions, because in cases such as Agurs and Moore the
Court did not find materiality sufficient for a rever-
sal. It can be argued that these findings were very
closely related to the lack of prosecutorial misconduct
in these cases. "6
"6Part of Justice Marshall's rejection of prosecutorial
misconduct as a concern of the Court was based on his belief
that the perjury standard, which puts a minimal burden on
the defendant, applies to a very limited category of cases,
not including those where the prosecutor deliberately
suppressed evidence that was clearly relevant and favorable
to the defense. Although the Court has never decided a case
involving this kind of blatant prosecutorial misconduct, it
can be argued that the perjury standard would apply to this
situation.
Judge Friendly, in United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138
(2d Cir. 1968), proposed three standards of materiality into
which the question of blatant prosecutorial misconduct is
subsumed. The "easy cases" are where the prosecutor's
suppression is deliberate, including perjury cases as well as
cases where there is a failure to disclose evidence "whose
high value to the defense could not have escaped the
prosecutor's attention." "Such cases rarely present a
problem as to 'the degree of prejudice which must be
shown'; almost by definition the evidence is highly mate-
rial." Id. at 146-47.
The second standard applies where a request is made for
evidence by the defense. Judge Friendly stressed the request
as a means of "flagging the importance of the evidence for
the defense," thus imposing on the prosecutor a duty to
carefully examine the contents of his files. Id. at 147.
The third category of cases are those where there was not
deliberate suppression of evidence and no request was
made, but "hindsight discloses that the defense could have
put the evidence to not insignificant use." Id. Judge
Friendly believed that in these cases, the standard of
materiality must be considerably higher because a prosecu-
tor may not realize the usefulness of certain evidence to the
defense, or may not be aware of its existence.
Judge Friendly conceded an interest in finality of
judgments, but argued that his categorization took this
interest into consideration. Few cases would be invalidated
due to deliberate prosecutorial misconduct, which occurs
rarely, and few reversals would occur when there is no
In the situation where there is a Rule 33 motion
for a new trial because evidence has been discovered
from a neutral source, the Court found that the
defendant's burden is the greatest. This can be
explained because of the prosecutor's freedom from
any blame.
Although the dissent believed that the actual
standard is what made the defendant's burden
greater in Agurs than in the perjury cases, it also can
be argued that all the standards enunciated by the
Court are the same. The different meanings inherent
in the standards are due only to the different contexts
in which they are applied. Although it is not the only
circumstance considered when determining the de-
gree of materiality necessary for a reversal, prosecu-
torial misconduct appears to be highly related to the
defendant's burden. A court will also consider the
relevance and favorableness of the undisclosed evi-
dence as an important circumstance in the determi-
nation of materiality.
The guidelines provided by the Court in Agurs
concerning the defendant's burden of proving materi-
ality will probably be more of an aid to courts than to
defense counsels and prosecutors. Although review-
ing courts will probably not decide cases any differ-
ently after the Agurs decision, Agurs expressly
allows them to find materiality where there has not
been a defense request for specific evidence. It will
only be after the courts have decided many cases
according to the rank-ordering guidelines of Agurs
that certain specific rules will emerge concerning the
prosecutor's duty of disclosure in various situations.
Prior to Agurs, the situation most puzzling to both
prosecutors and defense counsel was where the
undisclosed evidence was neither requested nor indic-
ative of perjury. Unfortunately, Agurs does not ap-
pear to give the prosecutor or defense counsel much
additional guidance in this decision-making proc-
ess. Although Agurs clarifies the defendant's bur-
den of proving materiality in certain situations, it
does not really give any practical assistance to the
parties who must make decisions in nondisclosure
situations.
prosecutorial misconduct, due to the heavy burden placed
on the defendant. Id. at 148.
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